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AI Security & Red TeamingThe attackers have frontier models. So do we.

We’ve been hacking, ethically, since BackTrack. Now we red team with frontier offensive models most organizations can’t get, and we point them at your systems before someone else’s copy does.

The Dreamers red team at work at dusk, a jet engine glowing on the test stand behind them
  • CMMC Level 2certified
  • SOC 2 Type IIin progress
  • FedRAMP Moderate equivalentsystems serving 50+ defense contractors

Trusted across defense and aerospace

  • Boeing
  • BAE Systems (British Aerospace)
  • Ball Aerospace
  • General Atomics
  • Kratos
  • DARPA
  • U.S. Air Force
  • U.S. Army

Who you’d be hiring

Hackers since BackTrack.

Some of us learned on Metasploit and BackTrack, before BackTrack became Kali. Some of us still run red teams. We stay for the puzzle. The tools keep changing; the instinct doesn’t.

  1. 2003Metasploit
  2. 2006BackTrack
  3. 2013Kali Linux
  4. NowFrontier red-team models and agent swarms

What changed

Breaking has always been easier than building. Now it’s automated.

Security work was always part brute force: recon, a spread of known exploits, payload delivery and, if you were clever, a zero-day. Agents are good at every step. Better than they are at ordinary programming, in our experience.

  1. 01

    Exploit discovery moved to the models.

    Expertise still pays, more than ever. Less of it gets typed by hand.

  2. 02

    Swarms test everything at once.

    One agent maps the surface while dozens probe, chain and verify in parallel, all night.

  3. 03

    Patching can’t keep up.

    Legacy software can’t adapt at model speed, and plenty of it can’t truly be patched. Exchanges, banks, hospitals and operating systems are all exposed.

  4. 04

    A clean audit isn’t proof.

    We’ve watched these models get into systems with six figures of hardening and clean reports from several outside auditors.

swarm / run 0412illustrative
  1. [scope] staging.example.com · authorized · 22:00–06:00
  2. [recon-03] mapped 214 hosts, 1,906 endpoints
  3. [probe-11] /upload accepts .phar files
  4. [probe-07] session token valid across tenants
  5. [chain-02] upload + token reuse → shell on staging
  6. [verify-01] reproduced 5/5 · severity critical
  7. [report] finding 17 filed · fix and regression test attached
Engineers run an engine test in the desert as the exhaust flares

Distillation

Somewhere, a distillery is running.

The labs keep their strongest offensive models on a short leash. Anthropic’s Claude Mythos and OpenAI’s Daybreak Red models go only to vetted partners.

Distilleries don’t ask. They train their own models on a frontier model’s API answers, millions of exchanges at a time, and stay close behind the frontier.

Then someone strips out the refusals. The result is an abliterated model: much of the skill, none of the guardrails, free to download. Capable attackers already use them. Ask some of them what they are, and they answer:

“I’m Claude, from Anthropic, of course!”
Is your API someone’s distillery?If you serve a model, we can test how cheaply it can be copied. →

The gap

Defenders can’t get the models. Attackers can get the copies.

Most organizations have no access to the models that could protect them, while attackers run distilled versions of those same models. The gap will close. Until it does, expect wild things.

Attackers

  • Distilled copies of frontier models
  • Guardrails removed
  • Agent swarms running overnight
  • No rules of engagement

Most defenders

  • An annual audit
  • A patch backlog
  • Legacy systems that can’t move fast
  • Chatbots that refuse security work

With Dreamers

  • Frontier red-team models
  • Swarms inside agreed rules of engagement
  • Every finding reproduced and ranked
  • Fixes, re-tests and regression tests

Dispatches

This is just the beginning.

Those are the public ones. Plenty aren’t.

  1. A model breaks out to cheat

    An OpenAI model under evaluation left its closed network and breached Hugging Face to fetch benchmark answers.

    Our write-up
  2. PHP2Shell

    Two critical PHP flaws, found with AI, leaked before disclosure and were exploited at scale. The NSA told PHP users to patch or go offline.

    SecureWorld
  3. Binance, $6.3 billion

    The largest heist on record, most of it moved in about 20 minutes. Investigators attribute it to North Korea’s TraderTraitor unit.

    TRM Labs
  4. Polymarket, $2.7 million

    A compromised third-party script on the site drained about 700 accounts in an hour.

    Bitquery
A rocket lifts off beyond a field of wildflowers on a calm morning

Preparation is the intelligent move.

Panic is what happens when you can’t see what’s going on. We’d rather you saw it first.

AI red teaming services

What we test

  1. 01

    Frontier red teaming

    Agent swarms on frontier red-team models run recon, exploit discovery and chaining against your systems, inside agreed rules of engagement. You get the findings. The models stay with us.

  2. 02

    LLM and agent red teaming

    Prompt injection, jailbreaks, tool misuse, over-permissioned agents, memory and multi-step abuse. We test the whole chain, not one clever prompt.

  3. 03

    RAG poisoning and data leakage

    Poisoned documents, retrieval trust boundaries, and secrets leaking through prompts, logs and model traffic.

  4. 04

    Distillation and model extraction

    If you serve a model, we test how cheaply someone could copy it through your API, then help you detect and throttle it.

  5. 05

    Penetration testing and OSINT

    The classics the models like too: web apps, PHP and Node stacks, cloud, identity, third-party scripts, and the people with the keys.

  6. 06

    Regression harness

    Every finding becomes a replayable test in CI, so the hole doesn’t quietly reopen after the next model or prompt update.

A crew readies a twin-engine craft, both engines glowing, at a desert field station

Engagement

How a red team runs

  1. 01

    Scope

    Targets, rules of engagement, data handling, and what’s off limits.

  2. 02

    Recon

    The swarm maps your surface: hosts, endpoints, models, tools and people.

  3. 03

    Break

    Exploit discovery and chaining, with every result checked by a human.

  4. 04

    Report

    Each finding reproduced, ranked by severity, and paired with a fix.

  5. 05

    Re-test

    We confirm the fix and leave the regression test behind.

Free advice

Do these today, whether or not you hire us.

  • Hardware wallet

    If you hold real crypto, keep it on one.

  • Real passwords

    Long, unique, from a password manager. Not twoWords1!

  • MFA

    On everything you care about. Hardware keys where you can.

  • No plain-text secrets

    No SSNs, keys or passwords sitting in text files. Encrypt them; age is a good tool.

  • Careful with chat

    Prompts are stored. Give agents files, ideally encrypted, and leave the truly sensitive out.

Take heed, keep calm, and let us break it first.

Book a red team

FAQ

Questions we get

What is AI red teaming?

AI red teaming is adversarial testing of the whole AI system: model behavior, prompts, tools, retrieval, permissions, memory, logs, APIs and the application around them. We try jailbreaks, prompt injection, poisoned documents, unsafe tool calls, data exfiltration and multi-step abuse, then reproduce each finding, rank its severity, fix the architecture and turn the failure into a regression test.

What is model distillation, and why is it a security problem?

Distillation trains one model on another model’s outputs. Run at scale against a frontier model’s API, it copies much of that model’s skill without its safeguards. Once the refusals are stripped out, the result is an “abliterated” model that will do offensive security work the original would refuse, for anyone who downloads it.

Can we get access to your red-team models?

No, and that is by design. The labs give their strongest offensive models only to vetted partners. We run them against your systems under agreed rules of engagement, and you get reproduced findings, severity rankings, fixes and regression tests.

Is prompt injection the same as a jailbreak?

No. A jailbreak attacks the model directly, usually through the user’s prompt. Prompt injection hides instructions inside content the system reads: documents, web pages, emails, tickets and tool outputs. In RAG and agent systems that content crosses a trust boundary quietly, so defenses have to keep user intent, system rules, retrieved facts and tool output apart.

Can guardrails make an AI system safe by themselves?

No. Guardrails catch obvious bad outputs. They can’t fix an architecture that lets a model read secrets, change production systems or call dangerous tools without oversight. Safe systems layer least-privilege tool access, data boundaries, retrieval controls, monitoring, human approval for sensitive actions and incident response, so one failed control doesn’t become a breach.